Fraud/Default/Arrest

www.capillarytech.com Date: October 31, 2026 To, To, BSE Limited National Stock Exchange of India Limited Listing Department Listing Department Phiroze JeeJeebhoy Towers, Dalal Exchange Plaza , Bandra Kurla Complex Street Fort, Mumbai -400001 Bandra (East), Mumbai -4000051 Scrip Code: 544614 Symbol: CAPILLARY Dear Sir/Madam, Subject: Disclosure under Regulation 30 of the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 read with Para A of Part A of Schedule III –Forensic Audit Report and its summary Dear Sir/Madam, This is further to our letter dated July 31, 2026, in which the Company informed you of the initiation of a forensic audit by KPMG in connection with the cyber-enabled banking fraud incident at a step- down subsidiary of the Company. Pursuant to Regulation 30 read with sub-clause 17(b) of Para A of Part A of Schedule III of the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (“SEBI Listing Regulations”), we wish to inform you that the Company received the forensic report from KPMG on October 30, 2026 and brief summary of the report is: The forensic investigation by KPMG Česká republika, s.r.o. report establishes that the incident was a fraud carried out by external parties who impersonated a senior executive and an outside lawyer using a look-alike email domain and off-channel communications. Furthermore, the report establishes that there was no traditional email spoofing, forged use of the Company’s real domain, malware, endpoint compromise, mailbox compromise, account takeover, or unauthorised access to the Company’s systems, devices, or email accounts. It also establishes the absence of questioned employee involvement or wrong doing on their part or any technical compromise, while confirming that the Company has further strengthened its payment controls and is actively pursuing recovery and legal remedies. This intimation will also be made available on the website of the Company and can be accessed using the below link: https://www.capillarytech.com/investors/shareholder- information/corporate-announcements/2026-27/ We request you to take the above information on records. Yours faithfully, For Capillary Technologies India Limited Gireddy Bhargavi Reddy Company Secretary and Compliance Officer Membership No. A17091 Place: Bengaluru Capillary Technologies India Limited CIN- L72200KA2012PLC063060 Regd. Office - 360, bearing PID No: 101, 360, 15th Cross Rd, Sector 4, HSR Layout, Bengaluru, Karnataka 560102 Email: secretarial@capillarytech.com Website: www.capillarytech.com Tel: 080-41225179 KPMG Confidential | Project Cluewire Project Cluewire Executive Summary and Management Report Suspected payment-diversion fraud affecting Session M Czech Republic s.r.o. Prepared for Capillary Technologies India Limited Classification: KPMG Confidential Date: October 2026 1 | P a ge KPMG Confidential | Project Cluewire 1. Purpose and reporting basis This management report distils the principal findings, open matters, business implications and immediate actions arising from the draft forensic report prepared by KPMG Česká republika, s.r.o. The summary is intended for Capillary Technologies India Limited management, Legal, Risk, Finance and Security stakeholders. It does not replace the detailed forensic report, evidence register or technical annexures. The report concerns four disputed payments totaling EUR 3,041,169.90 executed from Session M Czech Republic s.r.o. between 26 June 2026 and 2 July 2026. The investigation reviewed two forensic laptop images, mailbox and authentication records, communications, transaction documentation, Google Workspace-related logs, Google Takeout exports and open-source intelligence material. 2. Executive incident synopsis The available evidence is most consistent with a multi-stage payment-diversion fraud based on executive and legal- professional impersonation, social engineering, a lookalike domain and off-channel communications. The communications presented a purported confidential acquisition transaction and were supported by an NDA, invoices, payment requests, beneficiary banking details and payment confirmations. The reviewed evidence does not support a finding that malware, endpoint compromise, corporate mailbox compromise, successful unauthorized access or traditional email spoofing caused the payments. Relevant emails were sent from an operational lookalike domain, law-ogier.co.uk, rather than through forged infrastructure purporting to be the legitimate ogier.com domain. The use of deepfake voice or video remains an allegation that could neither be substantiated nor refuted because original audio, video, telecommunications metadata and mobile-device artefacts were not available. 3. Key facts for management Area Management position Four disputed foreign payments totalling EUR 3,041,169.90 were Financial impact identified. Three payments were made to ZZDJB CO LIMITED at HSBC Payment route Hong Kong and one payment to ZHONGXIAN TRADING PTE. LTD at UOB Singapore. Executive and external-lawyer impersonation, Primary mechanism confidentiality/urgency pressure, WhatsApp and personal email, supported by formal-looking transaction documents. No incident-related malware, unauthorized remote-access tools, Endpoints persistence, credential theft utilities or malicious scripts were identified on the two reviewed laptops. No evidence of successful unauthorized mailbox access, Mailboxes / identity malicious forwarding, mailbox-rule manipulation or account takeover was identified in the supplied records. No traditional spoofing was identified. The reviewed messages Email infrastructure passed available SPF/DKIM checks for the lookalike sending domain. Not technically determined because original mobile, audio/video, Deepfake allegation call metadata and telecommunications evidence were unavailable. The first-hop payments are evidenced. Ultimate onward Fund tracing movement, beneficial ownership, beneficiary-bank intelligence and recovery are outside the current forensic scope. 4. Hypothesis assessment Hypothesis Current assessment Management interpretation H1 Deepfake-assisted impersonation Unable to substantiate or refute Treat as an unverified allegation; strengthen 2 | P a ge KPMG Confidential | Project Cluewire executive verification regardless. Email authentication alone does not establish Lookalike-domain impersonation supported; H2 Email impersonation / spoofing legitimacy of the underlying sender or traditional spoofing not identified business instruction. No corporate account-compromise root H3 Mailbox / account compromise Not supported by evidence reviewed cause identified from supplied records. No endpoint-compromise root cause H4 Endpoint involvement Not supported by evidence reviewed identified on the two reviewed laptops. First-hop fund diversion is established from H5 Multiple-beneficiary fund diversion Supported transaction and banking records; onward tracing requires separate action. 5. Management implications • Primary business risk is not presently evidenced as technical compromise of corporate endpoints or mailboxes. It is the ability of external personas to exploit authority, secrecy, urgency, non-standard channels and formal-looking documents to induce authorized payment activity. • The circumstances surrounding the disputed transactions suggest that confidential, time-sensitive transaction requests may warrant enhanced scrutiny and verification. Management may consider assessing whether existing beneficiary- validation, callback, escalation, treasury, and approval processes provide sufficient assurance for high-value transactions involving newly introduced counterparties. • The use of personal email accounts and WhatsApp reduced organizational visibility and limited the availability of native evidentiary records. Consideration should be given to implementing independent verification procedures for executive payment requests and transaction approvals, pa [Showing first 8,000 characters — download PDF for full document]